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Prohibiting Medical Method Patents: A
Criticism of the Status Quo
Mark S. Wilke*
Methods of medical treatment are not patentable in Canada. This means that
inventions involving the performance of surgery, administration of medicine, or ex-
traction of fluids or tissue for diagnostic tests cannot directly be protected under the
current patent regime. However, this prohibition is not an absolute ban. Many med-
ical innovations are patentable, including surgical tools and devices, drugs and
other chemical compounds, medical “uses”, diagnostic assays and methods of treat-
ing “natural” conditions. The practical reality is that the distinction between what is
and what is not patentable is poorly defined. This uncertainty presents a steep chal-
lenge for inventors and patent agents in preparing patent claims that appropriately
encapsulate a particular medical invention without claiming prohibited subject mat-
ter. This confusion also hinders the public and would-be inventors wishing to navi-
gate the patent landscape.
Part I of this paper entitled “Legal Basis for the Prohibition” summarizes the
statutory and jurisprudential basis for prohibiting medical method patents. Part II
entitled “Patentability of Medical Methods in Practice” discusses how this prohibi-
tion has been applied by courts and the Commissioner of Patents. Inconsistencies in
its application are highlighted and practical guidance is provided on how to protect
aspects of medical inventions without triggering the prohibition. Part III entitled
“Criticism of the Status Quo” argues that the rationale for prohibiting medical
method patents is tenuous, based more on public policy than the Patent Act.1 Based
on the irregular application of the prohibition revealed in Part II and the criticisms
raised in Part III, legislative reform is recommended.
I. LEGAL BASIS FOR THE PROHIBITION
Methods of medical treatment are not expressly prohibited in the Patent Act.
In fact, it is not obvious from the wording of the Patent Act that medical methods
were intended to be banned at all. As will be discussed below, the leading common
law authority for the prohibition is primarily based on a repealed provision of the
Patent Act. What remains is the somewhat tenuous decision to exclude medical
methods as non-commercial activities which do not fit within the statutory defini-
tion of “invention”.
* B.Sc., Ph.D., J.D., is an articling student at Smart & Biggar/Fetherstonhaugh in its
Vancouver office. The views expressed in this paper are personal to the author and do
not necessarily represent the views of Smart & Biggar/Fetherstonhaugh or clients of the
firm. The author is indebted to Emily Marden for her insight and advice in preparing
this manuscript.
1 Patent Act, RSC 1985, c P-4.
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(a) Patentable Subject Matter
A patent grants the exclusive right to make, use, sell, and import a patented
invention for twenty years.2 In exchange for this valuable monopoly, the patentee
must disclose how to make and use the patented invention. This quid pro quo is
intended to encourage innovation by facilitating the prompt sharing of new technol-
ogy with the public; the public may immediately learn from the invention as well as
freely exploit the invention once the patent expires.3
In Canada, these patent rights arise from the Patent Act. As expressed by the
Supreme Court of Canada, “There is no inherent common law right to a patent. An
inventor gets his patent according to the terms of the Patent Act, no more and no
less”.4 For an invention to be eligible for a patent it must not only be novel, non-
obvious, and useful (or have utility),5 it must also fall within appropriate statutory
subject matter for a patent. The definition of “invention” in section 2 of the Patent
Act suggests that patentable subject matter includes “any new and useful art, pro-
cess, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful im-
provement in any art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter.” In
Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), the Supreme Court of Can-
ada noted that this definition reveals that certain subject matter is excluded from
patentability: 
[T]he definition of “invention” in the Patent Act is broad. Because the Act
was designed in part to promote innovation, it is only reasonable to expect
the definition of “invention” to be broad enough to encompass unforeseen
and unanticipated technology. I cannot however agree with the suggestion
that the definition is unlimited in the sense that it includes “anything under
the sun that is made by man”. In drafting the Patent Act, Parliament chose to
2 Section 42 of the Patent Act grants the exclusive right to make, use, and sell the inven-
tion. The exclusive right to import patented products or products prepared using pat-
ented processes or machines is not expressly provided by the Patent Act, but is clearly
accepted at common law (e.g. Société des usines chimiques Rhône-Poulenc v. Jules R.
Gilbert Ltd. (1967), 35 Fox Pat. C. 174 at para. 73 (Can. Ex. Ct.); affirmed [1968]
S.C.R. 950, 69 D.L.R. (2d) 353). Sections 44 and 45 of the Patent Act specify that
patents filed on or after 1 October 1989 last for twenty years from the filing date, while
patents filed before 1 October 1989 expire seventeen years from the date on which the
patent was issued.
3 There is some debate as to whether or not or to what extent patents actually foster
innovation in society (see Bronwyn H. Hall, “Patents and Patent policy” (2007) 23(4)
Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol. 568). Two prominent questions are (1) whether patents, while
helpful in investment heavy industries such as the pharmaceutical and biotechnology
sectors, are perhaps less productive in other industries, such as the information technol-
ogy sector; and (2) how do patent laws affect technology transfer to developing
countries?
4 Farbwerke Hoechst A.G. vormals Meister Lucius & Bruning v. Canada (Commissioner
of Patents), [1964] S.C.R. 49 at 57, 41 C.P.R. 9.
5 The requirements for novelty and utility (or “usefulness”) are derived from s 2 of the
Patent Act, which defines “invention” as “any new and useful art” [emphasis added].
The requirement for non-obviousness (or “inventiveness”) is derived from s. 28.3 of
the Act.
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adopt an exhaustive definition that limits invention to any “art, process, ma-
chine, manufacture or composition of matter”. Parliament did not define
“invention” as “anything new and useful made by man”. By choosing to
define invention in this way, Parliament signalled a clear intention to in-
clude certain subject matter as patentable and to exclude other subject mat-
ter as being outside the confines of the Act.6
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada commented in Monsanto Canada Inc.
v. Schmeiser that “[c]laims that would otherwise be valid may be limited by statu-
tory provisions or by jurisprudence”.7 The only explicit statutory exclusion of sub-
ject matter is found in section 17(8) of the Patent Act, which identifies a “mere
scientific principle or abstract theorem” as non-patentable subject matter. In addi-
tion, the courts have identified various other subject matter as inappropriate for
patenting, including professional skills,8 arts or processes lacking in commercial
value,9 higher life forms,10 and methods of medical treatment.11
(b) Art & Process
From the definition of “invention” in section 2 of the Patent Act, any “art” or
“process” may be patentable, so long as it is new, useful and not obvious. However,
neither the term “art” nor the term “process” is defined in the Patent Act. From case
law, the term “art” has a broad meaning that includes the term “process”.12 The
bygone Exchequer Court of Canada defined “art” as follows: 
An art or operation is an act or series of acts performed by some physical
agent upon some physical object and producing in such object some change
either of character or of condition. It is abstract in that, it is capable of
contemplation of the mind. It is concrete in that it consists in the application
of physical agents to physical objects and is then apparent to the senses in
connection with some tangible object or instrument.
In the earlier development of patent law, it was considered that an invention
must be a vendible substance and that unless a new mode of operation cre-
ated a new substance the invention was not entitled to a patent, but if a new
operation created a new substance the patentable invention was the sub-
6 Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), 2002 SCC 76, [2002] 4 S.C.R.
45 at para. 158, [2002] S.C.J. No. 77 [emphasis added].
7 Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, 2004 SCC 34, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 at para. 132,
239 D.L.R. (4th) 271 [Schmeiser].
8 Lawson v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents) (1970), 62 C.P.R. 101 (Can. Ex. Ct.)
[Lawson].
9 Shell Oil Co. v. Canada (Patent Commissioner), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 536, 142 D.L.R. (3d)
117 [Shell Oil cited to SCR]; Progressive Games Inc. v. Canada (Commissioner of
Patents) (1999), 3 C.P.R. (4th) 517, (sub nom. Progressive Games Inc. v.
Commissioner of Patents) 177 F.T.R. 241 (Fed. T.D.) [Progressive Games cited to
C.P.R], affirmed 9 C.P.R. (4th) 479, 265 N.R. 392 (Fed. C.A.).
10 Harvard College, supra note 6; Schmeiser, supra note 7.
11 Tennessee Eastman Co. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [1974] S.C.R. 111, 33
D.L.R. (3d) 459 [Tennessee Eastman cited to SCR].
12 Progressive Games, supra note 9 at para. 13.
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stance and not the operation by which it was produced. This was the confu-
sion of the idea of the end with that of means. However, it is now accepted
that if the invention is the means and not the end, the inventor is entitled to
a patent on the means.13
The Supreme Court of Canada case of Shell Oil Co. v. Canada (Commissioner
of Patents) is considered the leading Canadian authority on the meaning of the term
“art” for the purposes of the Patent Act. According to the Court, the term “art” has
the following characteristics:
(i) it is not a disembodied idea but has a method of practical application;
(ii) it is a new and innovative method of applying skill or knowledge; and
(iii) it has a result or effect that is commercially useful.14
Most medical methods arguably fit this definition. A medical method is not a
disembodied idea. Surgical procedures, drug administration, tissue extraction, etc.
all have the practical application of either treating a medical condition or modifying
a patient’s body for cosmetic or other reasons. Assuming novelty, a medical
method requires the skill or knowledge of a medical practitioner or other person to
be performed. In some cases, only a minimal degree of skill or knowledge will be
necessary and in others, a high level of expertise will be required. The trickiest
stage of the test is part (iii), but it is at least arguable that a medical method “has a
result or effect that is commercially useful”. There is a clear commercial result in
that a medical practitioner is paid for performing a medical method. This is true
both within the public health care system (where government funds employ medi-
cal practitioners) and private clinics (where individuals and insurance companies
pay for certain medical services). For example, a new method for performing a
rhinoplasty appears to do something that is commercially useful; it facilitates creat-
ing a new nose for a paying customer, regardless of whether that customer is the
patient or the government.
A “process” is more specific than an “art” in that “[a] process implies the
application of a method to a material or materials.”15 Moreover, a process that con-
sists of applying a known method to known materials may still be patentable pro-
vided it is non-obvious and produces a new and useful result.16 The Manual of
Patent Office Practice (“MOPOP”), prepared by the Canadian Intellectual Property
Office (“CIPO”), describes a “process” as “a mode or method of operation by
which a result or effect is produced by physical or chemical action, by the operation
or application of some element or power of nature or one substance to another.”17
As with the more general term “art”, methods of medical treatment appear to fit
13 Lawson, supra note 8 at 109-10, cited in Shell Oil, supra note 9 at para. 42.
14 Shell Oil, ibid, rephrased in Progressive Games, supra note 9 at para. 16.
15 Canada (Commissioner of Patents) v. Ciba Ltd., [1959] S.C.R. 378 at para. 15, 18
D.L.R. (2d) 375 [Ciba cited to S.C.R.].
16 Ibid.
17 Canadian Intellectual Property Office, “Manual of Patent Office Practice” (December
2010), s 12.02.02 [MOPOP] (the author is well aware that the opinions of CIPO do not
constitute law in Canada, but the legal interpretation of CIPO is at least helpful in
delineating the scope of the law).
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within the definition of “process”. For example, a surgical procedure can be de-
scribed as the application of a method to the materials of the human body, namely
human organs or tissues.
Given the above discussion, medical methods arguably fit within “art” and
“process” and could therefore be considered appropriate statutory subject matter for
a patent. The courts apparently disagree; they have consistently found medical
methods non-patentable on the basis that they do not fit within the definition of
“invention” in section 2 of the Patent Act. The most authoritative statement on this
matter was made by the Supreme Court of Canada in Tennessee Eastman Co. et al.
v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents).18
(c) Professional Arts
Tennessee Eastman concerned claims for a method of sealing surgical inci-
sions or wounds in living tissue with a known chemical compound; an application
of the compound that was novel. At the Exchequer Court level, the application was
refused as being directed to a non-economic endeavour: 
In my view the method here does not lay in the field of the manual or pro-
ductive arts nor, when applied to the human body, does it produce a result in
relation to trade, commerce or industry or a result that is essentially eco-
nomic. The adhesive itself may enter into commerce, and the patent for the
process, if granted, may also be sold and its use licensed for financial con-
siderations, but it does not follow that the method and its result are related
to commerce or are essentially economic in the sense that those expressions
have been used in patent case judgments. The method lies essentially in the
professional field of surgery and medical treatment of the human body, even
although it may be applied at times by persons not in that field. Conse-
quently, it is my conclusion that in the present state of the patent law of
Canada and the scope of subject-matter for patent, as indicated by authorita-
tive judgments that I have cited, the method is not an art or process or an
improvement of an art or process within the meaning of s. 2(d) of the Patent
Act [R.S.C. 1952, c. 203].19
Accordingly, the Exchequer Court distinguished processes that produce a
product or a commercially useful result from non-economic professional arts,
which includes methods of medical treatment. The former method is patentable,
while the latter method is not.
This decision mirrored another decision of the Exchequer Court, Lawson v.
Canada (Commissioner of Patents), which was decided the same year as Tennessee
Eastman.20 In Lawson, the Exchequer Court rejected a patent application for a
method of subdividing parcels of land into “champagne glass” configurations, as
opposed to the usual rectangular lots. Citing from a decision of the High Court of
Australia dealing with a method of eradicating weeds, the Court noted that only
economically useful arts or methods are patentable and surmised in obiter that
18 Tennessee Eastman, supra note 11.
19 Tennessee Eastman Co. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents) (1970), 62 C.P.R. 117 at
para. 49, [1970] Ex. C.J. No. 14 (Can. Ex. Ct.) [emphasis added].
20 Lawson, supra note 8.
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medical methods were essentially non-economic: 
The point is that a process . . . must be one that offers some advantage
which is material, in the sense that the process belongs to a useful art as
distinct from a fine art . . . that its value to the country is in the field of
economic endeavour. (The exclusion of methods of surgery and other
processes for treating the human body may well lie outside the concept of
invention because the whole subject is conceived as essentially non-eco-
nomic . . .).21
The Court ultimately concluded that professional skills are generally non-pat-
entable art: 
It is obvious . . . that professional skills are not the subject-matter of a pat-
ent. If a surgeon were to devise a method of performing a certain type of
operation he cannot obtain an exclusive property or privilege therein.
Neither can a barrister who has devised a particular method of cross-exami-
nation or advocacy obtain a monopoly thereof so as to require imitators or
followers of his methods to obtain a licence from him.22
Likening the process of subdividing land to a professional skill, the Court held
that the claims at issue did not constitute patentable subject matter.23 Accordingly,
Lawson stands for the proposition that professional skills, such as a method of sub-
dividing land, the oratory skills of a barrister and the medical know-how of a sur-
geon, are essentially “non-economic” arts and thus outside the statutory definition
of “invention”.
(d) Repealed Subsection 41(1) of the Patent Act
Tennessee Eastman was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.24 The
Court pointed out that methods of medical treatment often include factors such as
determining proper drug dosages, methods of drug administration and the consider-
ation of counter-indications. The Court decided that methods incorporating these
factors were not appropriate subject matter for a patent on the basis of subsection
41(1) of the 1952 Patent Act,25 a provision that has since been repealed: 
In the case of a drug, the desirable effects must be ascertained as well as the
undesirable side effects. The proper doses have to be found as well as meth-
ods of administration and any counter-indications. May these therapeutic
data be claimed in themselves as a separate invention consisting in a method
of treatment embodying the use of the new drug? I do not think so, and it
appears to me that s. 41 definitely indicates that it is not so.26
Subsection 41(1) of the 1952 Patent Act reads as follows: 
In the case of inventions relating to substances prepared or produced by
21 Ibid at 110-11, citing from National Research Development Corporation’s Application,
[1961] RPC 135 at 145 (Australia).
22 Ibid at 111.
23 Ibid.
24 Tennessee Eastman, supra note 11.
25 Patent Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 203.
26 Tennessee Eastman, supra note 11 at 207 [emphasis added].
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chemical processes and intended for food or medicine, the specification
shall not include claims for the substance itself, except when prepared or
produced by the methods or processes of manufacture particularly described
and claimed or by their obvious chemical equivalents.
This meant that one could only claim chemically produced medical substances
to the extent that they were prepared by the specific process actually described in
the patent application, i.e. so-called product-by-process claims. In the view of the
Supreme Court of Canada, this provision implied that a new method of using a
known compound cannot be claimed because a method claim cannot be made apart
from the substance itself. To view it otherwise would provide a way of circum-
venting subsection 41(1) because the patentee would have a monopoly on how the
substance was used, regardless of how it was made: 
In my view, this necessarily implies that, with respect to such substances,
the therapeutic use cannot be claimed by a process claim apart from the
substance itself. Otherwise, it would mean that while the substance could
not be claimed except when prepared by the patented process, its use how-
ever prepared could be claimed as a method of treatment. In other words, if
a method of treatment consisting in the application of a new drug could be
claimed as a process apart from the drug itself, then the inventor, by making
such a process claim, would have an easy way out of the restriction in s.
41(1).27
Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Canada did not reject the claimed medical
method on the basis that it was a “professional skill”, as reasoned in the two afore-
mentioned Exchequer Court decisions. Instead, the Court interpreted the patentabil-
ity of medical methods in the context of subsection 41(1). This would appear to
limit the applicability of Tennessee Eastman to a narrow subset of medical methods
which relate to products that are both (1) made by a chemical process and (2) in-
tended for medicine. Furthermore, since subsection 41(1) was repealed in 1991,28 it
bears asking whether Tennessee Eastman remains good law at all.
(e) Following Tennessee Eastman
The Federal Court of Appeal addressed these concerns in Imperial Chemical
Industries v. Commissioner of Patents.29 The Applicant had argued that the Ten-
nessee Eastman decision did not provide precedent that all medical methods were
non-patentable: “[Tennessee Eastman] only prohibits the patentability of medical
methods which utilize materials prohibited pursuant to subsection 41(1), namely,
materials produced by chemical processes.”30 The Court disagreed, quoting the fol-
27 Ibid at para. 14 [emphasis added].
28 Bill C-22, An Act to amend the Patent Act and to provide for certain matters in relation
thereto, 2nd Sess, 33rd Parl, 1986-1987, cl. 28 (On 17 November 1987, s 41(1) of the
Patent Act was renumbered to s 39(1) and then repealed four years later, pursuant to s
39(1.1), which allowed pharmaceutical products to be patented directly, regardless of
the process used to make them).
29 Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Canada (Patent Commissioner), [1986] 3 F.C. 40,
9 C.P.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.) [Imperial Chemical cited to FC].
30 Ibid at para. 9.
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lowing passage from Tennessee Eastman: 
Having come to the conclusion that methods of medical treatment are not
contemplated in the definition of “invention” as a kind of “process”, the
same must, on the same basis, be true of a method or surgical treatment.31
According to the Federal Court of Appeal, this meant that the scope of the
Tennessee Eastman decision extends beyond cases governed by subsection 41(1): 
In my opinion, this is a clear and unequivocal statement that “methods of
medical treatment are not contemplated in the definition of ‘invention’ as a
kind of ‘process’”. That was the sole issue before the Court and it is here
answered in unmistakable and unambiguous language. Accordingly, in my
view, the force of that pronouncement cannot be restricted merely to factual
situations where subsection 41(1) of the Act applies.
However, this interpretation does not acknowledge that subsection 41(1) was
the only stated basis for finding that medical methods were not patentable. The
stark omission of “professional arts” from the Supreme Court of Canada decision
of Tennessee Eastman implies that only the result of the Exchequer Court decision
was affirmed, not the reasons. The Supreme Court of Canada seemed to acknowl-
edge this point in Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), where it
was noted that “[i]n Tennessee Eastman Co. . . . the determination that a method for
bonding incisions and wounds was not an ‘art’ or a ‘process’ was based primarily
on the fact that the bonding material itself when prepared for medical purposes
would not be patentable under what was then s. 41 of the Patent Act”32 While
usage of the word “primarily” here suggests that the Court did consider additional
non-stated grounds, the Supreme Court of Canada notably did not state that this
was due to the “professional skill” rationale raised by the Exchequer Court in Law-
son and Tennessee Eastman.
More recently, the Supreme Court of Canada has indicated its approval of the
reasoning used by the Exchequer Court in Tennessee Eastman. In Shell Oil, the
Supreme Court of Canada made the following statement with explicit reference to
the fact that the lower court decision was affirmed by Canada’s highest court: 
In Tennessee Eastman Co. v. Commissioner of Patents (1970), 62 C.P.R.
117 (Ex. Ct.); aff’d [1974] S.C.R. 111 . . . The applicant appealed to the
Exchequer Court and the issue there was limited to the question whether this
use of the adhesive fell within the meaning of new and useful “art” or “pro-
cess” within the meaning of the Patent Act. It was held that it did not for the
reasons given by the Commissioner. In effect, it was not patentable because
it was essentially non-economic and unrelated to trade, industry or com-
merce. It was related rather to the area of professional skills.33
The above quote specifically references the Exchequer Court decision, not that
of the Supreme Court of Canada. This quote was cited by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd., again indicating that the com-
mon law finds medical methods non-patentable because they are non-economic
31 Ibid at para. 11, citing Tennessee Eastman, supra note 11 at 119.
32 Harvard College, supra note 6 at para. 145 [emphasis added].
33 Shell Oil, supra note 9 at para. 41.
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professional arts: 
The [Tennessee Eastman] decision was based on the former s. 41 of the
Patent Act, now repealed. The Court concluded that the method (apart from
the compounds) was not patentable. The policy rationale, as explained by
Wilson J. in Shell Oil . . . was that the unpatentable claim was 
. . . essentially non-economic and unrelated to trade, indus-
try, or commerce. It was related rather to the area of profes-
sional skills.34
Given these indications and the clear position of the Federal Court of Appeal,
the non-patentability of methods of medical treatment appears to generally be ac-
cepted at common law. However, such a broad prohibition may encapsulate many
medically-related inventions that are not necessarily professional arts or otherwise
essentially non-economic in character or result. This issue is discussed in Part II.
II. PATENTABILITY OF MEDICAL METHODS IN PRACTICE
“Methods of medical treatment” is a broad term which could arguably include
any specialized procedure, skill or technique performed in the course of treating a
patient. Recall that “methods” are patentable in general, but that the common law
draws a distinction between methods that constitute a “manual or productive art”
(such as a process to produce a product) and those that are essentially a non-eco-
nomic endeavour (such as a “professional skill”). The former is patentable; the lat-
ter is not. This means that some methods related to medicine are still patentable.
The tricky part is discerning between a prohibited method of medical treatment and
a patentable method that is merely related to medicine. The goal of this section is to
assess the scope of the prohibition by reviewing case law and the decisions of the
Commissioner of Patents.35 Such an analysis reveals that this scope is poorly de-
fined, making it difficult to predict whether or not a particular patent claim will be
rejected.
While assessing the patentability of a claim is highly fact dependent, a claim is
generally at risk of being rejected as a method of medical treatment where it recites
any of the following:
1. surgery, physiotherapy, or any other manual manipulation of the
patient;
2. administration of drugs or other compounds to the patient;
3. extraction of blood or other tissues from the patient for diagnostic
tests; or
4. choosing proper dosages or other analytical methods.36
34 Apotex Inc v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd., 2002 SCC 77, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 153 at para.
49, 21 C.P.R. (4th) 499 [Wellcome cited to S.C.R.].
35 Because only a handful of such cases have come before the courts, it is instructive to
additionally review decisions of the Commissioner of Patents. While Commissioner
decisions have no precedential value, the Commissioner’s discussion of the relevant
jurisprudence and its application to factual scenarios illustrates how these situations
may play out in the courts.
36 MOPOP, s. 17.02.03.
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Despite this, a questionable claim may yet be patentable. For example, meth-
ods for treating “natural” conditions are not prohibited.37 Unfortunately, the dis-
tinction between “natural” and “pathological” is often unclear. Furthermore, claims
that do not require a medical practitioner’s skill or judgment are more likely to be
found patentable than claims that do.38 Even minimal discretion on the part of the
medical practitioner appears sufficient to reject the claim, even where the same
degree of discretion on the part of a non-medical professional would not condemn
the claim. Similarly, a claim to a drug that recites a specific dosage regime may be
patentable so long as there are no steps requiring professional judgment.39 Addi-
tionally, diagnostic methods may be patentable, provided they are neither therapeu-
tic nor include steps involving the collection of blood or tissue from the patient.40
Finally, the “use” of a compound or device for treating a disease or condition is not
prohibited as a medical method.41 Each of these situations is discussed in detail
below; inconsistencies in the case law and Commissioner decisions are highlighted
and practical advice is provided for drafting non-prohibited patent claims.
(a) Natural Conditions & Cosmetic Treatments
A number of court and Commissioner decisions have addressed the issue of
whether or not methods of treating natural or non-pathological conditions are pat-
entable. For example, is a method which is entirely cosmetic patentable since it
possesses no therapeutic value?
In Re Revici, the Commissioner rejected claims teaching a method of prevent-
ing or reducing the desire for smoking tobacco in humans by administering a cer-
tain composition.42 The applicant argued that a desire to smoke was not an ailment
and the composition used in the method was not a medicine.43 The Commissioner
held that any substance used for modifying organic functions in man or animal was
a medicine in the broad sense, and thus any method involving manipulation of or-
ganic function constitutes a medical treatment.44
Similarly, in Commissioner Decision #1114 the Commissioner rejected claims
to a cosmetic method of increasing skin cell turnover without causing skin irritation
37 General Hospital Corp. Patent Application No. 532,566, Re (1996), 74 C.P.R. (3d) 544
(Can. Pat. App. Bd. & Pat. Commr.) [Re General Hospital].
38 Commissioner Decision #1086 (15 August 1986) online: <http://brevets-patents
.ic.gc.ca/opic-cipo/comdec/eng/decision/1086/summary.html?query=1086+%3Cin
%3E+comdecnumber&start=1&num=10>.
39 Axcan Pharma Inc. v. Pharmascience Inc., 2006 FC 527, 50 C.P.R. (4th) 321, 291
F.T.R. 160 (Eng.) [Axcan].
40 Application for Patent of Goldenberg, Re (1988), 22 C.P.R. (3d) 159 (Can. Pat.
Commr.) [Re Goldenberg].
41 Wellcome, supra note 34.
42 Revici, Re (1981), 71 C.P.R. (2d) 285 at para. 1 (Can. Pat. App. Bd. & Pat. Commr.).
43 Ibid at paras. 2-3.
44 Ibid at para. 5.
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by applying various formulations to the skin.45 The Commissioner decided that
even though the claims were phrased in terms of a cosmetic method, they are nev-
ertheless primarily directed to a medical method. The basis for this appeared to be
that the method comprised treating living skin tissue, as opposed to dead tissue, like
hair or nails, by removing dead cells from the outer layer of the skin so as to pro-
mote new skin cell growth.
More recent Commissioner decisions have taken a narrower view of medical
methods. For example, Re General Hospital Corp. concerned claims directed at
“[a] method of preventing pregnancy in a female mammal,” which comprised of
administering certain compounds at specified times.46 The applicant argued that
since pregnancy is not a disease, but a “natural condition”, a method of preventing
pregnancy is not a medical method as no pathological condition is cured. The Com-
missioner approved the claims, citing the Supreme Court of Canada in Burton
Parsons Chemicals v. Hewlett-Packard, where the use of a conductive cream was
held not to be a medical method because use of the cream for attaching electrodes
to the skin during surgery was not necessarily “the main or primary use of the
product.”47 The Commissioner stated that even where prevention of a potentially
damaging pregnancy could have beneficial effects to a female, the main or primary
use of the invention was not as a method of medical treatment.48
Cosmetic claims have similarly been interpreted narrowly in more recent
years. In Re Senenteck plc, the Commissioner accepted method claims directed to
reducing the adverse effects of aging so as to reduce wrinkles.49 The following
claim is representative of those at issue: 
A method for ameliorating the adverse effects of aging on mammalian cells,
comprising contacting mammalian cells with a cosmetic composition that
contains an effective concentration of a 6-(substituted amino) purine
cytokinin, wherein: 
the cells are on the surface of a living animal; and
the concentration is sufficient to ameliorate the adverse ef-
fects of aging of said cells, whereby the rate of develop-
ment of characteristics of said cells that are associated with
cellular aging is reversed or slowed, and the growth rate
and total proliferative capacity of the cells subsequent to
said contacting is substantially the same as prior to said
contacting.50
The Commissioner decided that even though the claimed method causes
45 Commissioner Decision #1114 (20 April 1988), online: <http://brevets-patents
.ic.gc.ca/opic-cipo/comdec/eng/decision/1114/summary.html?query=1114+%3Cin
%3E+comdecnumber&start=1&num=10>.
46 Re General Hospital, supra note 37 at para. 7.
47 Ibid, citing Burton Parsons Chemicals Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard (Canada) Ltd. (1974),
[1976] 1 S.C.R. 555 at 570, 54 D.L.R. (3d) 711 [Burton Parsons cited to S.C.R.].
48 Ibid at para. 13.
49 Application for Patent by Senentek plc, Re (1997), 77 C.P.R. (3d) 321 (Can. Pat. App.
Bd. & Pat. Commr.) [Re Senenteck].
50 Ibid at para. 3.
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changes in skin cell metabolism which retard the aging process, aging is a natural
condition, not a disease. Accordingly, the method was not considered a method of
medical treatment since no pathological condition is cured.51
The judiciary appear to share the more recent view of the Commissioner of
Patents. In Visx Inc. v. Nidek Co., the Trial Division of the Federal Court held that
claims related to a device for use in laser eye surgery were not medical methods
partly on the basis that the conditions to be treated by the claimed device were not
diseases: “[I]n accordance with Dr. Sher’s evidence, myopia, hypermyopia and
astigmatism are not diseases, they are human conditions.”52
The Federal Court of Appeal provided the most authoritative statement on this
matter in Imperial Chemical. The invention at issue was for a method of cleaning
teeth by applying aqueous compositions which were not produced by a chemical
process. The method apparently had two purposes:
(1) the medical purpose of removing dental plaque and reduce the likeli-
hood of cavities and periodontal disease; and
(2) the cosmetic purpose of removing stains.
Citing Burton Parsons as authority, the applicant argued that the claimed
method was not in its “main and primary function” a medical method because it
clearly had a cosmetic purpose.53 The Court rejected this argument and held that
the claims were directed to a medical method. The fact that one of the leading
functions of the claimed method had a medical purpose was sufficient to classify it
as non-patentable subject matter: “I see no error in law . . . in characterizing the
invention as having a medical function simply because it may also have another
leading function, namely, a cosmetic one.”54 The Federal Court of Appeal clarified
that, in its view, Burton Parsons was only relevant to claims subject to subsection
41(1) of the Patent Act. Moreover, even assuming that Burton Parsons did apply,
the Court reasoned that it is possible to have more than one “main or primary”
purpose in a product.55
According to CIPO in MOPOP, the state of the law is such that claims will be
considered methods of medical treatment where they provide “a practical therapeu-
tic benefit to a subject, . . . cure, prevent or ameliorate an ailment or pathological
condition, or treat a physical abnormality or deformity such as by physiotherapy or
surgery.”56 However, the aforementioned jurisprudence has not provided this level
of specificity. It is more appropriate to conclude that claims to methods that prima-
rily treat physiological conditions which cannot be characterized as diseases are
patentable. Notably, treating a disease need only be a leading function of the inven-
tion, not the only or primary function, in order for that invention to be non-
51 Ibid at para. 7.
52 Visx Inc. v. Nidek Co. (1999), 3 C.P.R. (4th) 417 at para. 173, 181 F.T.R. 22 (Fed.
T.D.) [Visx cited to C.P.R.], ; affirmed 2001 FCA 215, 16 C.P.R. (4th) 251 (although
the issue of non-patentable medical methods was not raised in the appeal).
53 Ibid at para. 5.
54 Ibid at para. 8.
55 Ibid at paras. 6–8.
56 MOPOP, s. 17.02.03.
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patentable.57
Given the above, it appears that methods relating to a physiological condition
which can be categorized as “natural” may be patentable. This includes methods for
ameliorating human deficiencies such as myopia. This perspective marks a diver-
gence from earlier Commissioner decisions, such as Re Revici and Commissioner
Decision #1114, where method claims were not patentable for merely involving the
manipulation of living organic functions. A useful practical example of this princi-
ple was presented in Biotechnology and Chemical Patent Practice in Canada — A
Practical Guide: 
[I]t is entirely natural with age for blood pressure to increase, bones to be-
come brittle, and hair to fall out. Following this logic, a method for treating
increased blood pressure in a 65-year-old would fall within the ambit of Re
Senenteck as a natural condition. However, treating high blood pressure in a
juvenile may be a pathological treatment and, hence, unpatentable.58
As this excerpt illustrates, the distinction between a “natural” condition and a
“pathological” condition is decidedly unclear. This makes it hard to predict what is
and what can be patented with any degree of certainty, especially where inventions
have both therapeutic and cosmetic effects. At present, patent agents are recom-
mended to direct medically or cosmetically related method claims to the treatment
of natural conditions, where possible.
(b) Steps Requiring Professional Skill or Judgment
In general, a claim that recites a step requiring the skill or judgment of a medi-
cal professional will be rejected as a method of medical treatment, even if that step
can be performed by a non-professional.
In Commissioner Decision #1086, claims to a non-surgical method of prevent-
ing pregnancy by constructing a plug in a patient’s oviduct were rejected as a medi-
cal method.59 The applicant argued that the claim was merely directed to a method
of manufacturing a commercial product in situ (i.e. in the patient), but the Commis-
sioner found that the skills of a medical professional were required to tailor the
plug to each patient’s individual anatomy.
By contrast, the Federal Court in Visx, commented that claims to a surgical
device, which included “means” for “shaping, focusing and directing the beam”,
did not explicitly claim steps requiring surgical skills, even though the surgeon had
to operate the machine: 
These patents do not teach professional skills to surgeons. They deal with an
apparatus, a machine, a combination of several components. . . . The inven-
tion in the Visx patents does not pose a limitation upon the surgeons’ skills.
On the contrary, it is meant to assist a surgeon in his operation on the human
eye. . . . All the surgeon does is prepare the patient and enter the basic mea-
surements into the computer. He then steps on the pedal to start the
57 Imperial Chemical, supra note 29 at para. 8.
58 The Biotechnology and Chemical Patent Group, Biotechnology and Chemical Patent
Practice in Canada: A Practical Guide, 2d ed (Canada: Borden Ladner Gervais LLP,
2008) at 84.
59 Commissioner Decision #1086, supra note 38.
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machine.60
In Imperial Chemical, the applicant argued that the claimed method of clean-
ing teeth was not a method of medical treatment because it was not restricted to
being practiced by medical professionals: “[I]ts practice is clearly not restricted to
doctors . . . it is not, in its main and primary function a medical method, any more
than the simple act of brushing one’s teeth is a medical method.”61 In finding the
method non-patentable, the Federal Court of Appeal focused on the result of using
the method and ignored the point that brushing one’s teeth obviously does not re-
quire the specialized skill or judgment of a medical professional. Regardless, the
Court refused to overturn the rejection of the patent; so it would seem that non-
patentable medical methods do not necessarily require the specialized skill or judg-
ment of a medical professional in their use. At the same time, methods that do
require medical skill or judgment are still not patentable.
CIPO has taken the view that any “methods that involve performing surgery
on the human or animal body are excluded from patentability, whether the effect of
the surgery is therapeutic or not.”62 The rationale for this position is presumably
that any surgical step necessarily requires the professional skill of a surgeon.
(c) Diagnostic Methods
Diagnostic methods are related to medical methods, but they do not function
to treat a disease or disorder, per se, but instead analyze the physiological condition
of the patient. In Commissioner Decision #144, the Commissioner of Patents re-
versed the Examiner’s rejection of an in vitro diagnostic method which identified a
pathogen in a patient by determining whether a patient’s fluids contained antibodies
or antigens to that pathogen.63 The Commissioner rejected the Examiner’s argu-
ment that the method was essentially non-economic for being performed on human
body fluids, a non-industrial product.
In Commissioner Decision #1108, the Commissioner of Patents allowed
claims to a method of detecting pathogens in a patient by temporarily diverting a
small amount of the patient’s blood through an extracorporeal device that collects
the pathogens for subsequent in vitro analysis.64 The Commissioner held that the
method was diagnostic, not therapeutic, and was therefore patentable: 
We are persuaded that in the present arrangement the step of externally ad-
sorbing certain elements does not amount to a treatment of a person’s blood,
nor to a treatment of a human body, since no steps of treating the blood are
introduced, and the blood is merely returned to the body.
60 Visx, supra note 52 at para. 173.
61 Imperial Chemical, supra note 29 at para. 5.
62 MOPOP, s. 17.02.03.
63 Commissioner Decision #144 (23 March 1973), online: <http://brevets-pat-
ents.ic.gc.ca/opic-cipo/comdec/eng/decision/144/summary.html?query=144+%3Cin%
3E+comdecnumber&start=1&num=10>.
64 Commissioner Decision #1108 (26 August 1987), online: <http://brevets-pat-
ents.ic.gc.ca/opic-cipo/comdec/eng/decision/1108/summary.html?query=1108+%3Cin
%3E+comdecnumber&start=1&num=10>.
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. . .
If we look to the end use of Applicant’s process for the detection of patho-
gens in blood, we see no treatment of the blood is contemplated nor ef-
fected. Moreover, no curing or alteration of the metabolism of the body is
obtained.65
In Re Application for Patent of Goldenberg, the Commissioner allowed claims
teaching a method of locating a tumour by injecting the patient with radio-labelled
antibodies.66 The Patent Examiner argued that the claims constitute a medical
method because the patient’s metabolism would necessarily be changed by inject-
ing immunological agents. However, the method was held to be patentable because
the radio-labelled antibodies did not have a therapeutic effect, but only functioned
to assist in locating the tumour.67
Accordingly, certain methods of diagnosing a disease or other physiological
condition may be patentable, whether practised in vitro or in vivo. The caveat is
that surgical steps, such as collecting blood or tissue samples, or any other steps
requiring the exercise of professional art will be interpreted as medical methods
and render the claim non-patentable.
(d) Medical “Use” Claims
Related to “method” claims are “use” claims. The term “use” does not appear
in the definition of “invention” found in section 2 of the Patent Act, but it is now
accepted at common law that a new “use” of a known compound, composition, or
substance may be patented. In Shell Oil, the Supreme Court of Canada accepted the
patentability of a new “composition” comprising known compounds mixed with
adjuvants.68 While a composition that comprises known compounds in combina-
tion with a mere diluent is not considered patentable subject matter per se,69 the
Court noted that the invention was actually the discovery of a new “use” for the
compounds: 
The appellant has discovered that compounds having a specific chemical
structure have useful properties as plant growth regulators. Although . . .
these compounds were already known, their usefulness for this particular
purpose was not known. This new use for these old compounds is therefore
the appellant’s “invention” with respect to these old compounds. In order to
use them for this purpose, it has mixed them with the appropriate adjuvants
for their application to plants.70
The Court then held that a new “use” is a patentable invention since it falls
65 Ibid at 3-4.
66 Re Goldenberg, supra note 40.
67 Ibid at paras. 28-29.
68 The word “adjuvant” refers to a compound for delivering, modifying or enhancing the
function of the composition’s active ingredient.
69 Farbwerke Hoechst A.G. vormals Meister Lucius & Bruning v. Canada (Commissioner
of Patents) (1963), [1964] S.C.R. 49, 41 C.P.R. 9 (S.C.C.).
70 Shell Oil, supra note 9 at para. 22 [emphasis added].
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within section 2 of the Patent Act under “any new and useful art”: 
It is not the process of mixing the old compounds with the known adjuvants
which is put forward as novel. It is the idea of applying the old compounds
to the new use as plant growth regulators; the character of the adjuvants
follows inevitably once their usefulness for that purpose has been discov-
ered. What then is the “invention” under s. 2? I believe it is the application
of this new knowledge to effect a desired result which has an undisputed
commercial value and that it falls within the words “any new and useful
art”. I think the word “art” in the context of the definition must be given its
general connotation of “learning” or “knowledge” as commonly used in ex-
pressions such as “the state of the art” or “the prior art”. The appellant’s
discovery in this case has added to the cumulative wisdom on the subject of
these compounds by a recognition of their hitherto unrecognized properties
and it has established the method whereby these properties may be realized
through practical application. In my view, this constitutes a “new and use-
ful art” and the compositions are the practical embodiment of the new
knowledge.71
The Supreme Court of Canada recognizes the close link between a “use” and a
“method”. Indeed, a method may be viewed as the “practical application” of the
discovery of a new use. While it is not obvious that claiming a “use” or a “method”
in a patent significantly changes the scope of the applicant’s resulting monopoly,
the Supreme Court of Canada has distinguished between these terms. In Wellcome,
the patent at issue claimed various pharmaceutical formulations, useful in treating
AIDS/HIV,72 which contained the active ingredient 3’-azido-3’-deoxythymidine
(AZT). Several of these claims were limited by the language “for use in the treat-
ment or prophylaxis” of AIDS or human retrovirus infections and others were lim-
ited by the language “for the treatment or prophylaxis of an AIDS infection.”73
Citing Shell Oil, the Supreme Court of Canada clearly stated that claims directed to
the use of a substance were patentable, even when that “use” was medical treat-
ment: 
The AZT patent does not seek to “fence in” an area of medical treatment. It
seeks the exclusive right to provide AZT as a commercial offering. How
and when, if at all, AZT is employed is left to the professional skill and
judgment of the medical profession.74
Accordingly, the use of a substance or device for medical treatment is patenta-
ble, while the practical application of that use is not.
While the language of the particular claims at issue in Shell Oil and Wellcome
did not commence with the preamble “use of”, the Supreme Court of Canada made
it clear that the discovery of a new use was all that was necessary for patentability: 
. . . Having discovered the use, the appellant has then combined the com-
71 Ibid at para. 30 [emphasis added].
72 Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (“AIDS”) is an infectious disease caused by
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (“HIV”).
73 “Antiviral nucleosides”, Can Patent No 1238277, (14 March 1986), clms 21–23,
26–31, 34, 45, 49–73 and 74–78.
74 Wellcome, supra note 34.
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pounds with the appropriate carriers for their application to plants. It is not,
in my view, necessary in the case of the discovery of a new use for an old
compound that the combination of the compound with the adjuvant be itself
novel in any sense other than that it is required in order to give effect to this
particular use of the compound. This is not a case where the inventive inge-
nuity is alleged to lie in the combination; the combination is simply the
means of realizing on the newly discovered potential of the compounds.
This is a case where the inventive ingenuity is in the discovery of the new
use and no further inventive step is required in the application of the com-
pounds to that use, i.e. in the preparation of the appropriate compositions.75
In Re Application for Patent of Wayne State University, the applicant success-
fully convinced the Commissioner of Patents that “the use of the active ingredient
should be construed as extending to cover activities which can be regarded as ‘in-
dustrial’ in character but not extending to the actual treatment of disease by admin-
istration of the active ingredient.”76
It is now common practice for patent claims to begin with the preamble, “Use
of”, but CIPO warns that “[d]epending upon how a use claim is worded, it risks
being, in form or substance, a method.”77 Indeed, merely replacing the preamble,
“A method of”, with the preamble, “Use of”, will not necessarily constitute a pat-
entable claim. Two commonly accepted use claim formats are Swiss-type claims
and German-type claims, which have the following forms:
Swiss-type: 
• Use of compound X (or composition W) in the manufacture of
a medicament for the treatment of condition Y.78
German-type: 
• Use of compound X (or composition W) for the treatment of
condition Y.
• Compound X (or composition W) for use in the treatment of
condition Y.79
Since it is not clear that the different “use” claim formats provide equivalent
patent rights, it is recommended that all of the various claim types be included in a
patent application.
75 Shell Oil, supra note 9 at para. 31 [emphasis added].
76 Application for Patent by Wayne State University, Re (1988), 22 C.P.R. (3d) 407 at
paras. 4 and 13 (Can. Pat. App. Bd. & Pat. Commr.) [Re Wayne State].
77 MOPOP, s. 12.06.08d.
78 Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 2008 FC 142, 63 C.P.R. (4th) 406 at paras. 22–23
(The Federal Court commented that Swiss-type and German-type claims were both ac-
ceptable formats for “use” claims); Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 2007 FC 971, 61
C.P.R. (4th) 305 at paras.152–153; affirmed 2008 FCA 8, (sub nom. Apotex Inc. v.
Pfizer Canada Inc.) 72 C.P.R. (4th) 141 (The Federal Court upheld both Swiss and
German-type claims as valid “use” claims).
79 Ibid; Wellcome, supra note 34 (The Supreme Court of Canada held Claim 21, a Ger-
man-type claim, to be valid).
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(e) Drug Dosages
In general, drugs that treat a disease or medical condition at one concentration
are ineffective at lower concentrations and toxic at higher concentrations. Precise
tailoring of drug dosages to individual patients can be crucial to the utility of a
pharmaceutical invention.80 This step may be as simple as adjusting the dosage to
the weight of a patient or substantially more sophisticated, such as predicting an
individual patient’s responsiveness to a dosage through genetic screening or other
diagnostic analyses. As such, this area of patent law is especially relevant to the
growing field of personalized medicine.
In Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc., the claim at issue was directed to a drug
dosage that was appropriate for a patient that had eaten: 
Use of a therapeutically effective amount of azithromycin for the prepara-
tion of a pharmaceutical dosage form which does not exhibit an adverse
food effect for administration, in the treatment of an antimicrobial infection,
to a patient that has eaten.81
The Federal Court held that this claim was not directed to a medical method
because it does not teach “how” to treat the patient, only that the drug “can” be
administered to treat microbial infections “without concern as to the patient’s fed or
fasted state.”82
Similarly, in Merck & Co. v. Apotex Inc. the Federal Court upheld claims di-
rected to the dosage of a drug for the treatment of osteoporosis.83 While the com-
pound, method of administration and therapeutic purpose were all known in the
prior art, the applicant had discovered that an undesirable gastro-intestinal side-
effect was significantly reduced when the drug was orally administered once a
week rather than daily. The Court found that the claims were not medical methods: 
Merck submits that where the claims of a patent are for a vendible product
having economic value in trade, industry and commerce and are distin-
guishable from the work of a physician, which requires the exercise of spe-
cialized skill, the patent is taken out of the realm of Tennessee Eastman. The
how and when of administration is not a part of the patent. The inventors
provide a new product which physicians may choose to use in treating pa-
tients, based on their own skill and judgment . . .
I find that the patent is for a vendible product having real economic value,
as demonstrated by its immediate success in the market, and is, therefore,
not for an unpatentable method of treatment.84
In contrast, the Federal Court in Axcan Pharma Inc. v. Pharmascience Inc.
rejected the following drug composition claim (translated from French) on the basis
80 Recall that “utility” is a requirement for patentability (see note 5). Ascertaining the
appropriate dosage can be critical for a pharmaceutical invention to be patentable.
81 Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 2005 FC 1421, 43 C.P.R. (4th) 81 at para. 8, 282
F.T.R. 8 (Eng.) [Pfizer].
82 Ibid at para. 149.
83 Merck & Co. v. Apotex Inc., 2005 FC 755, 41 C.P.R. (4th) 35, 274 F.T.R. 113 (Eng.)
[Merck].
84 Ibid at paras. 29, 136-137 [emphasis added].
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that it was directed to a medical method: 
Pharmaceutical composition for the treatment of primary biliary cirrhosis,
characterized in that it includes ursodeoxyscholic acid as well as a vehicle
and if necessary pharmaceutical [excipients], the said composition being
processed in a form allowing for the said treatment of primary biliary cir-
rohosis based on a dose of 13 to 15 mg/kg/day.85
The Court held that the dosage regime was an essential feature of the inven-
tion and that determining the appropriate dosage required the physician to assess
the patient’s weight and metabolism, an exercise of professional skill and knowl-
edge: 
It is up to the physician based on his or her knowledge of the patient’s rate
of metabolism and other factors to determine the appropriate daily dosage. I
cannot, for a moment, contemplate that Axcan could claim exclusive pro-
perty in the dosage and sue a physician for prescribing Ursodiol for the
treatment of PBC at a dosage less than 13 mg/kg/day or greater than 15
mg/kg/day. In fact, Dr. Shaffer, who was called by Axcan, stated during
cross-examination that he has at times prescribed Ursodiol at dosages
greater than those set out in the patent.
. . .
[I]n this case the number of capsules to prescribe is a matter between the
patient and her doctor, and does not form part of a monopoly protected by
Letters Patent. Therefore, the patent is invalid because it claims a method of
medical treatment.
. . .
There is a distinction between the dosage in a capsule and a dosage range
based on the patient’s weight. As I read the claim, the emphasis is on the
dosage range, and a dosage range is not a vendable product.86
A dosage regimen was also at issue in Janssen Inc. v. Mylan
Pharmaceuticals ULC.87
One of the claims at issue read as follows: 
A use of galantamine from a first dosage of about 8 mg/day to a final dos-
age of about 16 mg/day to 24 mg/day for treating Alzheimer’s Disease
wherein said first dosage is for use for a period from about two weeks to
about ten weeks; and wherein the use of the first dosage from about two
weeks to ten weeks results in a lower final dosage.
Galantamine was already known to treat Alzheimer’s disease, but the patentee
had discovered that slow titration of the drug resulted in a lower effective dose and
reduced side effects. The Federal Court found the invention to not be patentable
because the claims taught a medical method. From expert evidence, the Court held
that titrating a drug required more skill and knowledge than strict adherence to the
patentees dosing regimen. Accordingly, practicing the invention would require the
85 Axcan, supra note 39 at para. 3 [emphasis added].
86 Ibid at paras. 35, 46, 48 and 51.
87 Janssen Inc. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals ULC, 2010 FC 1123 [Janssen].
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physician to practice his or her professional art: 
What is clear from the evidence is that prudent physicians like Dr. Sadavoy
who are attempting to manage the administration of drugs carrying side ef-
fects in the treatment of geriatric patients do so by considering a number of
individualized factors. . . . [T]his does not begin and end with the manufac-
turer’s dosing advice. In this context, the titration regimen claimed by Jans-
sen can only be seen as a recommendation to physicians. Effective patient
management may require on-going individualized surveillance and concom-
itant dosing adjustments.
. . .
By attempting to monopolize an effective titration regimen for galantamine,
the ’950 Patent interferes with the ability of physicians to exercise their
judgment in the administration of generic versions of the drug.88
From this limited jurisprudence, it appears as though claims involving a dos-
age must not be in the form of a range, such that in order to determine the appropri-
ate dosage for a particular patient, specific knowledge of that patient is required,
and judgement is required based on that knowledge; these are matters which fall
within the professional art of the physician, and are therefore nonpatentable. This
was the reasoning of the Commissioner of Patents in Re Allergan Inc., where “use”
claims that included a particular dosage range of botulinum toxin were rejected as
teaching a medical method.89 The Commissioner noted that the dose to be adminis-
tered to any particular patient depended on the discretion of the physician; this in-
cluded assessing the severity of the condition (e.g. the number of muscle groups
requiring treatment, the age and size of the patient and the potency of the toxin).90
Consistently, the Federal Court held in Merck & Co. v. Pharmascience Inc. that a
“use” claim incorporating a specific dosage (i.e. not a range) was patentable: 
[Incorporating all its dependencies, the claim at issue reads as follows:] 
The use of finasteride for the preparation of a medicament
adapted for oral administration useful for the treatment of
male pattern baldness in a person and wherein the dosage is
about 1.0 mg.
. . .
[A] distinction must be made between claims that rely upon
the skill and judgment of a medial practitioner and those
that deal with a vendible product, be it a scalpel, X-ray ma-
chine or 1 mg tablet that are to be used or prescribed for
use by such practitioner. In the present case, we have a 1.0
mg tablet taken as a daily dose. No skill or judgment is
brought to bear. It is a vendible product and not a method
of medical treatment.91
88 Ibid at paras. 50–52.
89 Allergan Inc., Re (2009), 79 C.P.R. (4th) 161 at para. 93 (Can. Pat. App. Bd. & Pat.
Commr.) [Re Allergan].
90 Ibid at paras. 94-95.
91 Merck & Co. v. Pharmascience Inc., 2010 FC 510, 85 C.P.R. (4th) 179 at paras. 6 and
114, 368 F.T.R. 1 (Eng.) (F.C.).
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Given the above, it is recommended that appropriate claims be drafted to char-
acterize the invention as a dosage form or kit (i.e. “vendible products”) that physi-
cally embodies a dosage regime or prescribed dosage amount, and omit any steps
requiring the discretion of a medical professional. For example, it would be prefer-
able to recite a tablet containing 80 mg of the active ingredient, rather than a tablet
processed in a form allowing for treatment based on a dose of 1 mg/kg body weight
of a subject per day.
III. CRITICISM OF THE STATUS QUO
In Canada, the exclusion of methods of medical treatment from patentable
subject matter is largely derived from common law. Following the repeal of subsec-
tion 41(1), the only legislative basis for prohibiting medical method patents is the
definition of “invention” in the Patent Act, which has been interpreted to exclude
arts and processes that are essentially non-economic (or not commercially useful)
in character or result. Professional arts, including medical methods, have seemingly
been viewed as non-economic because, like fine art, their societal value is not pri-
marily economic even though professionals are paid for their services. As indicated
by the Hippocratic Oath, the chief goal of medicine is not economic in nature, but
to improve health and preserve human life.92 However, it must be asked whether
the medical profession can really be considered a non-economic endeavour given
that modern medicine is generally practiced within a highly sophisticated commer-
cial (and arguably industrial) framework.93 Indeed, courts in the United Kingdom
abandoned this rationale in the 1970s, eventually opting for a specific statutory ex-
clusion. Mitnovetski & Nicol discussed this in their paper entitled, “Are patents for
methods of medical treatment contrary to ordre public and morality or ‘generally
inconvenient’?”: 
In Eli Lilly & Company’s Application (1975), 1975 R.P.C. 438 — for exam-
ple the [UK] court . . . refused a patent application, for the first time, on the
basis of the public policy proviso to section six of the Statute of Monopolies.
. . . The court acknowledged that the prohibition [on medical method pat-
ents] was “technically anomalous and therefore illogical” stating “the rea-
sons for such an exclusion appear to us to be based in ethics rather than
logic . . .”. The court decided that, although the “generally inconvenient”
exception in the Statute of Monopolies was never used before as the basis
for refusals of medical treatment applications, it “can no more be ignored”.
. . .
[M]ethods of medical treatment were expressly excluded by the parliament
of the United Kingdom in section 4(2) of the new legislation [Patents Act
1977 (U.K.), 1977, c. 37, s. 4(2)].94
92 O Mitnovetski & D Nicol, “Are patents for methods of medical treatment contrary to
ordre public and morality or ‘generally inconvenient’?” (2004) 30 J. Med. Ethics 470 at
470.
93 Patent exclusions that promote public health objectives, WIPO Standing Committee on
Patent Law, 15th Sess, Annex 4, Doc NoSCP/15/3 (2 September 2010) at 9 [2010
Standing Committee Report].
94 Mitnovetski & Nicol, supra note 92 at 471 [original references omitted].
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Furthermore, the United States has allowed medical method patents since
1954, despite statutory language very similar to section 2 of Canada’s Patent Act.
Under U.S. patent law, methods of medical treatment are considered a “useful pro-
cess” and fit within the scope of patentable subject matter, defined as “any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter”.95 These differ-
ences from Canadian jurisprudence suggest that the legal rationale for prohibiting
medical method patents in Canada is tenuous.
Still, many jurisdictions prohibit the patenting of medical methods, including
over 80 countries worldwide.96 The legal basis for the prohibition in these countries
varies, but there are generally three grounds:
(1) medical methods are not patentable subject matter because they are
inherently not industrial, economic or commercial in nature or result (e.g.
Canada and Japan);
(2) medical method patents violate public morality or public policy (e.g.
New Zealand); or
(3) medical methods are explicitly prohibited by statute (e.g. the United
Kingdom and other members of the European Union, India and China).97
While U.S. legislation does not prohibit medical method patents, per se, U.S.
law has a specific defence for medical practitioners using patented methods that
protect them from patent infringement.98 With several notable exceptions (e.g.
Australia99), the above reflects a general international consensus against patenting
methods of medical treatment. Many international and multinational treaties also
support this view. For example, Canada is a signatory to the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),100 the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)101 and the 1970 Patent Cooperation Treaty
95 Ex parte Scherer, 103 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 107 (1954); 35 USC § 101.
96 Robert M. Portman, “Legislative Restriction on Medical and Surgical Procedure Pat-
ents Removes Impediment to Medical Progress” (1996) 4 U. Balt. Intell. Prop. L.J. 91
at 118, cited in 2010 Standing Committee Report, supra note 93 at 9.
97 For a current summary, see 2010 Standing Committee Report, ibid at 5–40.
98 35 USC § 287(c)(1) (“With respect to a medical practitioner’s performance of a medi-
cal activity that constitutes an infringement under section 271(a) or (b) of this title, the
provisions of sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 of this title shall not apply against the
medical practitioner or against a related health care entity with respect to such medical
activity”).
99 Joos v Commissioner of Patents (1972), 126 CLR 611 (HC Aus); Anaesthetic Supplies
Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994), 50 FCR 1 (FC Aus); Bristol Myers Squibb Co v F H
Faulding & Co Ltd (2000), 46 IPR 553 586 (FC Aus).
100 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994,
1869 UNTS 299, 33 ILM 1197 [TRIPS].
101 North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada, the Gov-
ernment of Mexico and the Government of the United States, 17 December 1992, Can
TS 1994 No 2, 32 ILM 289 [NAFTA].
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(PCT),102 all of which contain provisions permitting (but not requiring) the exclu-
sion of methods of medical treatment from patentability.103 The reason for this
broad consensus appears to be a widely shared public policy concern.
In Canada, this public policy rationale has been clearly expressed. The Su-
preme Court of Canada surmised in Harvard College that the primary policy con-
cern was “presumably so as not to impede physicians in the practice of their profes-
sion”.104 Similarly, the Federal Court recently stated in Jenssen that “for ethical
and public health reasons, physicians should not be prevented or restricted from
applying their best skill and judgment for fear of infringing a patent covering a pure
form of medical treatment (as distinct from a vendible medical or pharmaceutical
product).”105 Considering that the overarching policy rationale for granting patents
at all is to encourage innovation, it would appear that refusing medical method
patents is intended to strike a balance between encouraging inventive solutions to
practical problems on the one hand and promoting public health (and perhaps not
offending the public sense of morality) on the other. A number of arguments have
been raised in favour of this policy; patenting medical methods may (1) impede the
dissemination of new methods of treatment; (2) deter physicians from performing
unlicensed methods out of financial interests and for fear of infringement; (3) in-
vade patients’ privacy during infringement lawsuits; and (4) increase health care
costs and reduce access to healthcare.106 While these concerns have been chal-
lenged by sceptics who argue that “every argument raised against methods of medi-
cal treatment patents could be equally raised against patents for drugs, medical de-
vices, and cosmetic treatment,”107 this same public policy rationale likely
underpins the decision to deny medical method patents in each of those jurisdic-
tions that do so.
While public policy may provide some insight into the legislative intent of
Parliament in drafting the Patent Act, it must be remembered that the exclusion of
medical methods from patentable subject matter is ultimately derived from statute,
not policy. The Supreme Court of Canada has explicitly stated that the Commis-
sioner of Patents does not have discretion to refuse a patent on the basis of public
policy: 
I disagree that s. 40 of the Patent Act gives the Commissioner discretion to
refuse a patent on the basis of public policy considerations independent of
102 Patent Cooperation Treaty, 19 June 1970, Can TS 1990 No 22, TIAS 8733 [PCT];
Regulations under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (as in force from 1 July 2010), on-
line: <http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/rules/#note1> [PCT Regulations].
103 Article 27.3(a) of TRIPS and article 1709(3)(a) of NAFTA explicitly permit members to
exclude methods of medical treatment from patentability. Rule 39.1 of the PCT Regu-
lations allows an International Searching Authority to decline to conduct patent
searches relating to medical methods of treatment. Article 27.2 of TRIPS and article
1709(2) of NAFTA allow patent applications to be refused due to considerations of
morality or the ordre public.
104 Harvard College, supra note 6 at para. 145.
105 Janssen, supra note 87 at para. 53.
106 Mitnovetski & Nicol, supra note 92 at 473–75.
107 Ibid at 473-74.
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any express provision in the Act. The non-discretionary nature of the Com-
missioner’s duty was explained in Monsanto Co., supra, a case cited by
Rothstein J.A. At pages 1119-20, after citing s. 40 (then s. 42) of the Patent
Act, Pigeon J., speaking for the majority, stated: 
I have underlined by law [in s. 42] to stress that this is not a
matter of discretion: the Commissioner has to justify any
refusal. As Duff C.J. said in Vanity Fair Silk Mills v.
Commissioner of Patents (at p. 246): 
No doubt the Commissioner of Patents
ought not to refuse an application for a pat-
ent unless it is clearly without substantial
foundation . . .
Some commentators remark that the Canadian courts have in the past ex-
cluded certain subject matter from patentability on moral, ethical or policy
grounds . . .. While it is true that certain categories of invention were ex-
cluded from patentability with these policy concerns in mind, these exclu-
sions were justified by reference to explicit provisions of the Patent Act.108
As the above passage implies, even the judiciary does not have the authority to
reject medical method patents purely on public policy grounds; this is the role of
Parliament.109 While some jurisdictions (e.g. members of European Union,110 New
Zealand111 and Japan112) have statutory provisions that grant courts discretion to
refuse a patent on ordre public or morality grounds, Canada has no such provi-
sion.113 Instead, courts may only weigh policy considerations to the extent that they
can aid in interpreting the Patent Act and other Canadian laws. While U.S. courts
have carved out a “moral utility” doctrine from the requirement for patents to have
utility, this doctrine is rarely used and has never been successfully applied to medi-
cal method patents.114 Moreover, a “moral utility” doctrine has not developed in
Canadian patent law.
Not only is the legal basis for the prohibition tenuously reasoned and the pol-
icy rationale for it controversial, the application of the prohibition by Patent Exam-
iners, the Commissioner of Patents and the courts is often unpredictable or illogi-
cal. The fuzzy distinction between “pathological” and “natural” conditions makes it
hard to confidently predict the current state of the art, particularly where inventions
108 Harvard College, supra note 6 at paras. 144-45 [emphasis in original].
109 To the best of the author’s knowledge, Canadian courts have never rejected a medical
method patent purely on the basis of public policy considerations.
110 European Patent Convention, 5 October 1973, 13 I.L.M. 268, art. 53 [EPC].
111 Patents Act 1953 (NZ), 1953/64, s 17(1)(b).
112 Patent Act (Japan), 1959/121, art. 32.
113 While article 27.2 of TRIPS, supra note 94, contains a similar provision to article 53 of
EPC, members of TRIPS are not required to implement a morality patent exclusion.
114 Lowell v. Lewis, Fed. Cas. No. 8568 (C.C. Mass. 1817), cited in Tol-o-Matic, Inc. v.
Proma Produkt-und Marketing Gesellschaft MbH., 945 F.2d 1546 at 1552 (Fed. Cir.
1991); US Patent and Trademark Office, Media Advisory, 986, “Facts on Patenting
Life Forms Having a Relationship to Humans” (1 April 1998), online:
<http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/1998/98-06.jsp>.
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have both therapeutic and cosmetic effects. For example, how does one reconcile
that a patentable method of diagnosis would be rendered non-patentable if a thera-
peutic benefit results considering that the medical professional performs the same
method regardless? Furthermore, it is inconsistent that methods requiring the pro-
fessional art of a medical practitioner are not patentable while methods directed to
non-medical fields require the same level of specialized skill and judgment. Even
methods for medically related fields can be patented, such as methods of diagnosis,
methods of preventing pregnancy, methods for ameliorating adverse effects of ag-
ing, and methods for medical research. Are these medically related fields more eco-
nomic or commercially useful than surgery or physiotherapy? Lastly, tweaking pat-
ent claims to avoid reciting a dosage range seems like an unnecessary complication
for inventors and patent agents as there may be an insubstantial degree of profes-
sional judgment in choosing an appropriate dosage. For example, weighing a pa-
tient and adjusting the dosage accordingly is not complicated. If an inventor has
demonstrated that a drug is most effective at a certain dosage per kilogram of body
weight, the claims should reflect that invention directly.
The above problems appear to follow from the position that all medical meth-
ods are not patentable. As the above issues demonstrate, many medically-related
inventions incorporate aspects that could be categorized as medical methods, but
are not necessarily professional arts or otherwise essentially non-economic in char-
acter or result. These issues may be avoided by replacing the concept of a general
prohibition with a case-by-case assessment of whether or not a particular medical
invention fits within patentable subject matter pursuant to the definition of “inven-
tion” in section 2 of the Patent Act. A related issue recently came before the Fed-
eral Court in Re Amazon.com Inc.115 The question was whether or not “business
methods” were generally non-patentable. In holding that business methods were
patentable in appropriate circumstances, the Court noted that each business method
must be evaluated for patentability by assessing whether it fits within section 2 of
the Patent Act: 
It is noteworthy that in both the above cited cases the claimed inventions
were found to be non-patentable subject matter. Not, however, because they
were business methods but because they were mere “schemes” or disem-
bodied ideas. . . . That is not the case with the business method claimed in
the present case.
The approach in the USA, Australia, and as it ought to be in Canada, makes
an eminent amount of sense given the nature of our legislation. It allows
business methods to be assessed pursuant to the general categories in s. 2 of
the Patent Act, preserving the rarity of exceptions. It also avoids the diffi-
culties encountered in the UK and Europe in attempting to define a “busi-
ness method”. There is no need to resort to such attempts at categorization
here. Contrary to what the Commissioner suggests, to implement a business
method exception would be a “radical departure” from the current regime
requiring parliamentary intervention.116
115 Amazon.com Inc., Re, 2010 FC 1011, (sub nom. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Canada (Attorney
General)) 86 C.P.R. (4th) 321 [Amazon].
116 Ibid at paras. 67-68.
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Similarly, methods of medical treatment ought to be assessed for patentability
on a case-by-case basis to prevent patentable methods from being unjustly rejected.
Banning all medical methods merely changes the question from “what fits the defi-
nition of ‘invention’” to “what fits the category of a ‘medical method’?”
The general exclusion of medical methods from patentable subject matter has
been read into the Patent Act by Canadian courts. While the judiciary justifies this
prohibition by asserting that methods of medical treatment are inherently not pat-
entable, this assertion may be based more on public policy than the language of the
Act. While many jurisdictions adhere to this policy, the accuracy of it remains a
controversial topic.117 Moreover, application of the prohibition has been unpredict-
able, which not only confounds patent agents, lawyers and inventors, but also
serves as an impediment for medically-related industries. While some of this uncer-
tainty may be due to a lack of Canadian jurisprudence on the matter, there appears
to be some deeper logical inconsistencies, which would be better dealt with using
legislative reform. For example, if the real purpose of the prohibition is to prevent
doctors from being sued for treating patients, then a defence against infringement
for medical practitioners, as used in the U.S., is a more direct and desirable ap-
proach. 
117 Mitnovetski & Nicol, supra note 92; 2010 Standing Committee Report, supra note 93.
